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TACKLING MERITLESS BID PROTESTS: THE
CASE FOR REBALANCING PROTEST COSTS
IN THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT ARENA
Eric S. Underwood*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Green Bay might not have had any time left in its season if not for referee Gene Steratore’s decision. Dez Bryant’s leaping, bobbling [thirty-one]-yard catch at the Packers
[one] on a fourth-and-[two] play was challenged by Green Bay coach Mike McCarthy.
Instead of first-and-goal for Dallas . . . the ball went over to the Packers.1

The Official Playing Rules of the National Football League (NFL) afford each
team two opportunities per game to challenge various rulings on the field (the
Coaches’ Challenge Rule).2 To challenge an official ruling, a coach simply throws a
red flag onto the field from the sideline.3 Each challenge triggers an instant replay of
the previous play.4 After review, the presiding official either confirms or reverses the
challenged ruling on the field.5
On January 11, 2015, Green Bay Packers Head Coach Mike McCarthy used one
of his challenges after Dallas Cowboys wide receiver Dez Bryant appeared to have
completed a catch at the Packers’ one-yard line.6 With four minutes and six seconds
left in the fourth quarter and the Cowboys then leading the game by one point, Coach
McCarthy knew that if the Cowboys scored a touchdown, his team’s chances of a
victory were slim to none.7 “That was such an impactful play,” McCarthy exclaimed
after the game.8 “You have to challenge that,” he continued.9

* J.D. Candidate, The University of Tulsa College of Law, 2017. First and foremost, I thank my wife, Taylor,
for her unwavering love, support, and confidence in me. I also thank my Tulsa Law Review colleagues for their constructive feedback and their exceptional efforts to refine this article into a finished product.
1. David Purdum, Associated Press, Two Second-Half TDs Help Packers Rally vs. Cowboys, ESPN.COM (Jan. 11,
2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/recap?gameId=400749518.
2. ROGER GOODELL, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 63 (2015), available
at http://operations.nfl.com/the-rules/2015-nfl-rulebook.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Vic Ketchman, McCarthy’s Challenge Saves the Day, PACKERS.COM (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.packers.com/
news-and-events/article-game-recap/article-1/McCarthys-challenge-saves-the-day/e3599c4d-da8f-430c-8dbb5f05643d18ca.
7. Purdum, supra note 1.
8. Ketchman, supra note 6.
9. Id.
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Fortunately for the Packers, Coach McCarthy’s judicious use of a challenge convinced referee Gene Steratore to reverse the previous ruling on the field that Bryant
made the catch.10 The reversed call elicited a turnover on downs and a significant
momentum shift in favor of the Packers, who went on to defeat the Cowboys 26-21
and earned themselves a chance to play the Seattle Seahawks for the 2014 National
Football Conference title.11
While a successful Coaches’ Challenge—especially on a crucial play—can contribute significantly to a victory for the challenging team, it does not guarantee a victory.12 Indeed, the Coaches’ Challenge Rule cuts both ways.13 For example, in 2014,
Kansas City Chiefs Head Coach Andy Reid challenged an official’s ruling that San
Francisco 49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick scrambled for a first down on a key
third-down play.14 Reid had a clear, up-close look at the play and was confident that
his opponent did not pick up the first down; so he tossed his red flag onto the field,
initiating an instant replay.15 After review, the official confirmed the ruling on the
field.16 The 49ers retained possession of the ball and subsequently scored the winning
touchdown in their 22-17 victory against the Chiefs.17
Just as NFL coaches can challenge an official ruling on the field, in the arena of
federal procurement, contractors enjoy similar opportunities to challenge the government’s contracting decisions.18 Filing a protest in one of three venues is the “red flag”
that initiates such a challenge.19 Additionally, like a Coaches’ Challenge, which does
not guarantee the challenging team a victory even if the challenge is successful, a
successful protest does not guarantee that the protestor will ultimately win a government contract.20 In fact, it is extremely rare for a protestor to win a contract subsequent to a successful protest.21
To illustrate this rarity, in fiscal year 2010 (FY10), out of roughly 1,500 protests
filed with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the GAO sustained merely
forty-five protests.22 Of those sustained protests, only eight resulted in a favorable
contract award for the protestor.23 Notwithstanding this statistical improbability, between FY01 and FY14, the frequency of protests to the GAO increased by roughly
125% (from 1,146 in FY01 to 2,561 in FY14).24 Conversely, during the same period,
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Randy Covitz, Chiefs’ Reid is Up to the Challenge When it’s Time to Throw the Red Flag, KAN. CITY STAR
(Oct. 10, 2014), available at http://www.kansascity.com/sports/nfl/kansas-city-chiefs/article2669622.html/ (discussing Kansas City Chiefs Coach Andy Reid’s unsuccessful challenge during the Chiefs’ game against San Francisco).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Covitz, supra Note 12.
18. See generally FAR 33 (2016).
19. Id. 33.103-105.
20. MOSHE SCHWARTZ & KATE M. MANUEL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. NO. R40227, GAO
PROTESTS: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS 9 (July 21, 2015), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40227.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3, 4 fig. 1.
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the frequency of sustained protests as a percentage of protests filed decreased by over
fifty percent (from 6% in FY01 to 2.9% in FY14).25
The increasing frequency of federal procurement protests to the GAO is subject to vigorous debate among government officials, end users of federal acquisitions,
and academics.26 On one hand, protests empower contractors to hold the government accountable for its business decisions.27 On the other hand, protests increase
the government’s cost of doing business.28
While there are several debates over whether the benefits of protests outweigh
the costs, one thing is certain: the government, as opposed to its private sector counterparts, bears the majority of costs that arise out of procurement protests.29 Of the
several factors that contribute to this phenomenon, one is especially intriguing—that
an interested party who does not win a government contract has little more to lose
by protesting the award in a misguided attempt to increase his chances of ultimately
getting a contract.30
Beyond the administrative costs of preparing the protest, as former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Dr. Jacques Gansler,
once put it, an offeror can essentially protest “for the price of a stamp.”31 In stark
contrast, upon receipt of a protest, the federal contracting agency must stay performance of the awarded contract, address each aspect of the procurement with which
the offeror takes issue, seek legal counsel, file a response, and wait for the respective
agency or the GAO to resolve the protest.32 If the GAO sustains the protest, the
government may become further obligated to pay the protestor’s costs—exclusive of
profit—of filing the protest, including reasonable attorney, consultant, and expert
witness fees, as well as bid and proposal preparation costs.33 If the GAO dismisses
or denies the protest, however, the protestor is not similarly obligated to reimburse
the government’s costs to resolve the protest.34

25. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 8 fig. 5.
26. See, e.g., Andy Medici & Jim McElhatton, How Bid Protests are Slowing Down Procurements, FED. TIMES, Jul. 21,
2013, http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20130721/ ACQUISITION03/307210001 (discussing various costs associated with bid protests); see also Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42
PUB. CONT. L.J. 489 (2013) (analyzing well-recognized costs and benefits that protests impose on federal procurements).
27. KATE M. MANUEL & MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. NO. R40228, GAO
BID PROTESTS: AN OVERVIEW OF TIME FRAMES AND PROCEDURES 3 (Jan. 19, 2016), available at
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40228.pdf.
28. Id. at 3-4.
29. See generally Gordon, supra note 26; FAR 33.104 (2016) (enumerating the procuring agency’s responsibilities
and costs that arise out of a protest).
30. Eric S. Crusius, Acquisition 101: When a Bargain Isn’t a Bargain, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.govexec.com/contracting/2015/01/acquisition-101-when-bargain-isnt-bargain/102672;
see
also
SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 9 (illustrating the low probability that a successful protest results in the
protestor ultimately getting a contract).
31. JACQUES S. GANSLER, AFFORDING DEFENSE 191 (1991); but see 4 C.F.R. § 21(f) (2016) (the current regulation
permits offerors to submit protests via hand delivery, mail, commercial carrier, facsimile, or email).
32. See generally FAR 33.104 (2016) (enumerating the procuring agency’s responsibilities in response to a protest).
33. Id. 33.104(h).
34. Id. (There is no requirement for an interested party whose protest is dismissed to reimburse the government’s
costs of addressing the protest).
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The objectives of this article are (1) to highlight the imbalance in which protest
costs are borne between the government and its private sector counterparts and (2)
to explore potential solutions to more equitably balance protest costs—especially
those associated with dismissed protests—in order to reduce the burden protests impose on government programs and, ultimately, taxpayers.35 In response to this analysis, Congress should amend protest regulations to require protestors to include a
bond with their protest equal to a percentage of the total contract value in an effort
to (1) suppress the apparent “What do we have to lose?” mentality that the current
protest system perpetuates and (2) to decrease the frequency of meritless protests.
Part II of this article clarifies the issue at hand with a brief overview of the
federal acquisition system, including a discussion that defines “protest” and identifies
who may protest, reasons one might file a protest, and the mechanics of filing a protest.36 Part III evaluates the costs and benefits that protests impose on the federal
procurement system and accepts, for the sake of argument, that the overarching benefits of protests justify the costs.37 Part IV posits that, due to the inverse relationship
between the frequency of protests and the number of sustained protests, the question
should not be whether the benefits of protests outweigh the costs, but whether opportunities exist to decrease meritless protests and the government’s administrative
costs associated with resolving them.38 Part IV also explores historically proposed
solutions to address this issue and offers a new solution inspired by existing state
procurement laws as well as previously unmentioned intricacies of the NFL’s
Coaches’ Challenge Rule.39
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Overview of the Federal Acquisition Regulation
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) codifies the processes and procedures by which the federal government acquires goods and services for executive
agencies.40 The overarching purpose of the FAR is to “deliver . . . the best value
product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling
public policy objectives.”41 To that end, the FAR aims to “satisfy the customer in
terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service”; “minimize
administrative operating costs”; and “conduct business with integrity, fairness, and
openness.”42 Inherent in these principles is the objective to promote competition for
government contracts.43

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See discussion infra Parts III & IV.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.
FAR 1.1 (2016).
Id. 1.102(a).
Id. 1.102(b).
Id. 1.102(b)(1)(iii).
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B. Protesting Government Procurement Actions
1. “Protest” Defined
A “protest” is “a written objection by an interested party” to: (1) a solicitation
or request for offers for a procurement, (2) the cancellation of a solicitation, (3) a
contract award or proposed contract award, or (4) a contract termination.44 For simplicity, one can classify protests into two categories: “pre-award” and “post-award.”45
By contrast, the GAO may not consider—among several enumerated issues—contract administration concerns, contracting officer determinations of contractor responsibility, untimely protests, protests that lack sufficient legal or factual grounds,
or subcontract protests.46
2. Who may Protest
Only interested parties may file a protest.47 An interested party is “an actual or
prospective offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award
of a contract or . . . failure to award a contract.”48 Typically, prior to contract award,
any prospective bidder qualifies as an interested party.49 Conversely, after contract
award, offerors who actually submitted bids or proposals are interested parties, as
only those offerors were eligible for award.50 Naturally, the “focus upon direct economic interest in determining who is an interested party means that a larger number
of contractors can generally bring pre-award protests than can bring post-award protests.”51 Concerned citizens and subcontractors usually lack standing to file a protest
because they have no direct economic interest in the procurement outcome.52
3. Reasons to Protest
Offerors protest federal contracting actions for a variety of reasons.53 First,
protests often stem from an offeror’s belief that the government made a material
error during the bidding process.54 Commonly cited errors include “poorly written
or vague contract requirements, failure to follow the process or [evaluation] criteria
laid out in the request for proposals, and failure to adequately document government

44. Id. 33.101.
45. See, e.g., FAR 15.507(a) (2016) (advising that “[u]se of agency protest procedures that incorporate the alternative dispute resolution provisions of Executive Order 12979 is encouraged for both preaward and postaward protests.”)
(emphasis added).
46. 4 C.F.R. § 21.5 (2016) (Nor may the GAO hear protests related to Small Business Administration issues,
procurement integrity, procurements by non-federal agencies, suspensions and debarments, competitive range determinations, or decisions to file a protest on behalf of federal employees).
47. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BID PROTESTS AT GAO: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE 6 (9th ed. 2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/ decisions/bidpro/bid/d09417sp.pdf.
48. FAR 33.101 (2016).
49. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 6.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
54. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 11.
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findings.”55 An unsuccessful offeror might also protest if the procuring agency did
not debrief the offeror after contract award.56 This can create the perception that the
procuring agency treated the contractor unfairly during the award process and, as a
result, often invites offerors to protest simply to gain access to information that
would otherwise become known during a debriefing.57 Notably, however, the government is only required to provide a debriefing upon an unsuccessful offeror’s
timely request, so the onus to initiate a debriefing is on the offeror.58
As further motivation to file a protest, analysts cite “the increase in value of
individual contracts, longer periods of contract performance, policy trends to insource more work, and decreased defense spending.”59 These factors increase contractors’ appetite for work and consequently make them more likely to protest unfavorable contract awards.60 This is especially true for incumbent contractors who do
not win a follow-on contract after their current contract expires.61 Since a GAO protest prevents the procuring agency from awarding a contract until the protest is resolved, incumbent contractors in this situation may be able to squeeze a few more
months—and additional revenue—out of their current contracts.62
Another economic incentive to protest especially exists within the realm of major defense acquisitions.63 In this “high-stakes, winner-take-all world . . . the winner
secures future revenue for decades.”64 As one government contracts attorney
acknowledged, “For the winner, it’s going to be worth billions of dollars over the
next 20 years. For the loser, they go home.”65 Aside from major defense acquisitions,
but on a related note, federal agencies are increasingly relying on strategic sourcing
for routine commodities and services in order to maximize the government’s buying
power.66 While strategic sourcing may secure better deals for the government, it also
limits opportunities to compete for government contracts.67 Thus, prospective contractors are willing to go to great lengths to win a contract, which may include filing
a protest.68

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also FAR 15.505(e), 15.506(d) (2016) (identifying the information an unsuccessful offeror may request
upon elimination from the competition).
58. FAR 15.505(a)(1), 15.506(a)(1) (2016). Accordingly, in most cases, if an unsuccessful offeror did not receive
a debriefing, it is because it did not request one.
59. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 11.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 11-12.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., TOMMY M. GATES, THIRD-PARTY PROTEST REGIME AND GAO PROTEST STATISTICS: DOD VS.
OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES 15 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a539659.pdf (discussing economic interests in protesting major defense acquisitions).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 15-16 (citing Richard Lardner, Do Defense Contractors Protest Too Much?, USA TODAY, May 24, 2008,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-05-23-3339653735_x.htm).
66. GATES, supra note 63, at 16.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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In addition to these glaring economic incentives, some contractors protest in
an attempt to influence procurement agency behavior in future competitions.69
Moreover, a contractor might protest to demonstrate to its shareholders and senior
leadership that it exhausted all available strategies to secure work.70 Protests also enable contractors to potentially stifle their competition by delaying a contract award.71
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the costs to file a protest are extremely
minimal.72 Thus, the marginal cost to file a protest beyond the time and expense a
contractor incurs to prepare a contract proposal essentially promotes a “What do we
have to lose?” mentality among contractors whose proposals do not result in a contract award.73
4. The Mechanics of a Protest
An interested party may file a protest with the procuring agency, the GAO, or
the Court of Federal Claims.74 The GAO, however, hears more protests than the
Court of Federal Claims.75 Moreover, statistics are not readily available to analyze
protests across all federal agencies.76 Accordingly, the scope of this article is limited
to protests to the GAO.77
A protest to the GAO begins when an interested party timely submits a notice
to the GAO that: (1) identifies the contracting agency and the solicitation or contract
number; (2) lists the legal and factual grounds of protest; (3) establishes that the protestor is an interested party; and (4) states the relief requested (e.g., termination or recompetition of a contract).78 Beyond these requirements, “[n]o formal briefs or other
technical forms of pleading or motion are required.”79 A pre-award protest is timely
if the procuring agency receives it prior to the deadline to submit proposals.80 A postaward protest, on the other hand, is timely if the procuring agency receives it “not
later than [ten] days after the basis of protest is known or should have been known
(whichever is earlier).”81

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 12.
Id.
Id.
See 4 C.F.R. § 21.1(c), (f) (2016) (outlining the requirements to file a protest).
Defense Industry Daily Staff, How the US GAO’s Bid Protest Process Works and Why Defense Contractors Abuse It,
DEFENSE INDUSTRY DAILY (April 22, 2010, 7:51 PM), http:// www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gao-protests-defense-programs-06269.
74. FAR 33.103-105 (2016).
75. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 1.
76. Id.
77. See discussion infra Parts I-V.
78. 4 C.F.R. § 21.1(c) (2016).
79. Id. § 21.1(f).
80. Id. § 21.2(a)(1).
81. Id. § 21.2(a)(2); but see id. §§ 21.2(a)(2)-(3), 21.2(c) (providing the following exceptions to this rule: First, “with
respect to any protest basis which is known or should have been known either before or as a result of the debriefing,
the initial protest shall not be filed before the debriefing date offered to the protester, but shall be filed not later than
10 days after the date on which the debriefing is held.” Additionally, “[i]f a timely agency-level protest was previously
filed, any subsequent protest to GAO filed within 10 days of actual or constructive knowledge of initial adverse
agency action will be considered . . . .” Finally, the GAO may consider an untimely protest “for good cause shown,
or where it determines that a protest raises issues significant to the procurement system.”).
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Upon receipt of a protest, the GAO must notify the procuring agency of the
protest within one business day.82 The agency then relays the protest to the contract
awardee if the agency awarded a contract.83 If the agency did not award a contract, it
must send the protest to all offerors eligible to receive a contract.84 Once a procuring
agency becomes aware of a pre-award protest, it may not award a contract until the
GAO resolves the protest, unless the head of the contracting activity determines that
“[u]rgent and compelling circumstances which significantly affect the interest of the
United States will not permit awaiting the decision of the GAO.”85 In federal procurement lingo, a protest elicits an “automatic stay”—also referred to as a “Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) stay”—on contract award.86
Similarly, upon notice of a post-award protest, “the contracting officer shall
immediately suspend performance or terminate the awarded contract” until the GAO
decides the protest.87 In addition to the “urgent and compelling circumstances” exception, the procuring agency may also proceed to award a contract if the head of the
contracting activity determines that “[c]ontract performance will be in the best interests of the United States.”88
Along with an automatic stay of contract award or performance, notice of a
GAO protest triggers the procuring agency’s duty to respond to the protest.89 Specifically, within thirty days of being notified of the protest, the procuring agency must
submit to the GAO:
[T]he contracting officer’s statement of the relevant facts, including a best estimate of
the contract value, a memorandum of law, and a list and a copy of all relevant documents, or portions of documents, not previously produced, including, as appropriate:
the protest; the bid or proposal submitted by the protester; the bid or proposal of the
firm which is being considered for award, or whose bid or proposal is being protested;
all evaluation documents; the solicitation, including the specifications; the abstract of
bids or offers; and any other relevant documents. In appropriate cases, a party may
request that another party produce relevant documents, or portions of documents,
that are not in the agency’s possession. 90

The protestor must comment on the agency’s report and submit its comments
to the GAO within ten calendar days after the GAO receives the agency’s report.91

82. Id. § 21.3(a).
83. 4 C.F.R. § 21.3(a) (2016).
84. Id.
85. FAR 33.104(b)(1) (2016).
86. See, e.g., MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 11.
87. FAR 33.104(c)(1)-(2) (2016); see also EOD Tech., Inc. v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 12 (2008) (upholding the
Army’s override of an automatic stay in a procurement for canine services for the Army Special Forces due to the
“urgent and compelling” need to mitigate the high risk of security breaches on military installations in Afghanistan);
see also TEAC Am. v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 876 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that the Navy’s override
of a protest regarding a contract for a cockpit video recording system for the F/A-18 aircraft was in the “best interest
of the United States” because failure to override would interfere with the aircraft’s deployment to Bosnia and troop
training and the public interest required that the troops be well equipped).
88. FAR 33.104(c)(2) (2016).
89. 4 C.F.R. § 21.3(c) (2016).
90. Id. § 21.3(d).
91. Id. §21.3(i).
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Subject to few exceptions, the GAO will dismiss the protest if the protestor fails to
submit comments within the ten-day period.92 Generally, the GAO must decide the
protest within one hundred days of the filing date.93 In FY14, the GAO resolved
protests on average within thirty-nine days.94
The GAO may dismiss, deny, or sustain a protest.95 The GAO ordinarily dismisses protests containing procedural defects such as (1) failure to address all requirements of 4 C.F.R. § 21.1 or (2) untimely filing.96 Similarly, if the GAO finds that the
procuring agency complied with procurement statutes or regulations, it denies the
protest.97 In either case, the procuring agency may proceed with its procurement
once the GAO announces its decision.98 Conversely, if the GAO determines that the
procuring agency violated procurement regulations, it sustains the protest and recommends that the agency implement one or more of several available remedies. 99
Additionally, the GAO may recommend that the procuring agency reimburse the
protestor for its costs of “(1) [f]iling and pursuing the protest, including attorneys’
fees and consultant and expert witness fees; and (2) [b]id and proposal preparation.”100
Interestingly, GAO decisions and recommendations are not legally binding
upon procuring agencies since “GAO is a legislative . . . agency and cannot constitutionally compel executive . . . agencies to implement its recommendations because of
the separation of powers doctrine.”101 Nevertheless, procuring agencies usually implement GAO recommendations.102
III. PROTEST COSTS AND BENEFITS
Without question, protests promote integrity within the procurement system
and enable interested parties to hold the government accountable for its business
decisions.103 These benefits, however, do not come without a cost.104 On the con-

92. Id.
93. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(a)(1) (2012); but see id. § 3554(a)(2) (under the “express option,” the GAO must decide a
protest within 65 days from the filing date).
94. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 14. The authors note that the GAO provided this data; however,
they acknowledge that it may be somewhat unreliable.
95. See FAR 33.104(a)(2) (2016) (mentioning that the GAO may deny a protest); see also id. 33.104(a)(3)(i)(A)
(identifying that the GAO may dismiss a protest); see also id. 33.104(h)(8) (outlining a situation in which the GAO
might sustain a protest).
96. 4 C.F.R. §§ 21.1(i), 21.2(b) (2016).
97. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 15.
98. Id.
99. 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(a) (2016). The available remedies are: (1) refrain from exercising options under the contract;
(2) terminate the contract; (3) re-compete the contract; (4) issue a new solicitation; (5) award a contract consistent
with statute or regulation; or such other recommendation(s) as GAO determines necessary to promote compliance.
100. Id. § 21.8(d).
101. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 16 (citing Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 809 F.2d
979, 986 (3d Cir. 1986)).
102. Id. at 16-17. Between FY01 and FY14, only in forty-two cases did a procuring agency decline to fully adopt
the GAO’s recommendations.
103. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 2.
104. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3-4.
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trary, protests impose costs on the federal procurement system that impact the government, contractors, and taxpayers.105 Whether these benefits outweigh the costs is
subject to vigorous debate.106 For example, in response to the 39% increase in Defense Department protests between 2001 and 2008, former acting Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, John Young Jr., asserted that
“[p]rotests are extremely detrimental to the warfighter and the taxpayer” and observed that “protest actions consume vast amounts of time for acquisition, legal[,]
and requirements team members; delay program initiation and the delivery of capability; strain relations with our industry partners and stakeholders; and create misperceptions among American citizens.”107 One of Young’s industry counterparts at Boeing similarly expressed, “At the end of the day, [protests] really slow[] down the
process of getting hardware and services to the warfighter.”108
Those at the other end of the spectrum applaud the protest system’s emphases
on transparency and accountability and downplay the costs borne by federal procurement stakeholders.109 The holders of this viewpoint remain steadfast that the benefits
of the protest system outweigh its costs.110 Moreover, some argue that the government’s costs to address protests “are often misunderstood and therefore overstated,
in terms of the frequency of protests, the length of time that they last, and the risk
that the agency’s choice of contractor will be overturned in the process.”111
This article by no means attempts to resolve the tension between the social,
economic, political, and practical undertones of these opposing viewpoints.112 To
fully appreciate the forthcoming recommendation, however, requires a brief discussion of the well-recognized costs and benefits of federal procurement protests.113
A. Protest Costs
Protests levy direct and indirect costs on the federal procurement system.114
The vast majority of direct costs come in the form of procurement delays and admin-

105. Robert Brodsky, Bidders Bite Back, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.govexec.com/ magazine/features/2011/02/bidders-bite-back/33195.
106. See generally id. (discussing several opposing viewpoints—including those of industry executives and federal
procurement officials—on protest benefits and costs); see also Gordon, supra note 26 (discussing the costs and benefits
of protests in federal procurement).
107. Brodsky, supra note 105.
108. Id. (quoting Daniel Beck, spokesman for The Boeing Company).
109. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 26, at 510 (asserting that “[w]hatever costs protests impose on the procurement
system are outweighed . . . by the benefits that protests bring, in terms of transparency, accountability, education, and
protection of the integrity of the U.S. federal acquisition system.”); see also Brodsky, supra note 105 (quoting Ralph
White, GAO’s Managing Associate General Counsel for Procurement Law, “What you get [via the protest system]
is a lot more transparency, integrity, or accountability than in other places . . . . It’s a system I would hate to walk
away from and think about what it would mean to provide no opportunity for a redress when people think that
something was unfair.”).
110. Gordon, supra note 26, at 510; Brodsky, supra note 105.
111. Gordon, supra note 26, at 510.
112. See discussion infra Parts I-V.
113. See discussion infra Part III.
114. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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istrative costs, whereas indirect costs stem largely from behavioral effects that protests—or, perhaps more accurately, the fear of protests—have on federal procurement officials.115
1. Procurement Delays
Within the context of procurement delays, the CICA stay is the most obvious
delay that protests generate.116 Subject to the exceptions discussed above, under
CICA, a procuring agency may not award a contract in the midst of a pending preaward protest to the GAO.117 Similarly, in the case of a post-award protest, the contracting agency must suspend contract performance until the GAO resolves the protest.118 In either case, a CICA stay commences after a contractor files a timely protest
and the GAO subsequently notifies the respective contracting agency.119
In theory, a CICA stay may last as long as one hundred days—the number of
days in which the GAO must typically resolve a protest.120 Thus, unless the agency
overrides the CICA stay or extends the period of performance of an existing contract
(via a “bridge contract”) to continue service during the stay, the end user of the procurement may suffer mission delays lasting as long as one hundred days.121 Ironically,
to override a CICA stay or award a bridge contract also involves intense bureaucratic
scrutiny that may contribute to additional delays within the existing one hundred day
window.122 Moreover, a protestor may appeal a CICA stay override to the United
States Court of Federal Claims, which, if successful, reinstates the automatic stay.123
Another unfortunate consequence of the CICA stay is it creates the presumptive perception that the contracting agency violated procurement regulations.124
In addition to the CICA stay, further mission delays may result if the procuring
agency takes corrective action in response to a GAO protest.125 That is, after it receives a protest, the procuring agency perceives that it may have erred during the
bidding process and voluntarily corrects its mistake.126 Of course, “[s]uch voluntary
action by an agency could indicate that the agency believes that a given protest has
merit,” which renders this cost outside the scope of the issues this article intends to
115. See id.
116. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 11.
117. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) (2012).
118. Id. § 3553(d)(3)(a).
119. Id. § 3553(d)(3), (4).
120. Id. § 3554(a)(1); but see id. § 3554(a)(2) (discussing the sixty-five day time frame under the “express option”).
121. Id. § 3553(c)(2)(A), (d)(3)(C); see also Kevin J. Wilkinson & John M. Page, CICA Stays Revisited: Keys to Successful
Overrides, 66 A.F. L. REV. 135, 152-54 (2010) (discussing the use of “bridge contracts” to alleviate mission impacts
associated with automatic CICA stays).
122. See Wilkinson & Page, supra note 121, at 155 (observing that “decisions to override CICA stays must be made
judiciously and are subject to intense scrutiny” and that “bridge contracts are plausible alternatives to overrides provided they are tailored appropriately to bridge gaps in necessary services and do not circumvent federal procurement
law.”).
123. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 13 n. 95 (observing that, “[s]ince Ramcor Servs. Group, Inc. v. United
States, 183 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1999), all such suits have been brought in the Court of Federal Claims.”).
124. GATES, supra note 63, at 23.
125. Gordon, supra note 26, at 502 (citing SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40227, GAO BID
PROTESTS: TRENDS, ANALYSIS, AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 10 (2011)).
126. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 125, at 5.
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address.127 Nevertheless, corrective action can significantly delay an acquisition.128
For example, if an agency decides to take corrective action, a typical remedy is to recompete the requirement, which can easily exceed one hundred days.129
Similarly, the most significant delays ordinarily occur when the GAO “sustain[s]
a protest and the agency implements the GAO’s recommendation . . ..”130 As with
corrective action, the agency often re-competes at least part of the competition, which
can also exceed delays associated with a CICA stay.131
2. Administrative Costs
Protests also increase the administrative costs of the federal procurement system.132 Most notably, upon receipt of a protest, the procuring agency must address
each aspect of the procurement with which the offeror takes issue, seek legal counsel,
file a response, and wait for the respective agency or the GAO to resolve the protest.133 While the costs associated with these activities are difficult to quantify—as
every acquisition is unique in its own right—one can confidently speculate that significant cost drivers include the complexity of the acquisition, the number of offers
received, and the value (or estimated value) of the contract award.134
Additionally, if the GAO sustains a protest, it may recommend that the contracting agency reimburse the protestor’s costs—exclusive of profit—of filing the
protest, including reasonable attorney, consultant, and expert witness fees, as well as
bid and proposal preparation costs.135 Like the costs discussed above, these costs are
difficult to quantify and vary from one acquisition to the next; however, similar factors likely influence these costs.136 Also inherent in this situation is the GAO’s determination that a protest has merit, which likewise renders these costs outside those

127. Id. While the objective of this article is tailored more towards meritless protests, the fact that corrective action
occasionally occurs in response to a protest is mentioned to identify it as another source of protest-related procurement delays.
128. Id. at 10.
129. Id.
130. Gordon, supra note 26, at 503.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Lardner, supra note 65 (observing that in 2008, Comptroller General Gene Dodaro sought a forty
million dollar (roughly eight percent) increase to the GAO’s budget to accommodate the steadily growing number of
contract protests).
133. See generally FAR 33.104 (2016) (enumerating the procuring agency’s responsibilities in response to a protest).
134. See, e.g., id. 15.404-1(a)(1) (“The Contracting Officer is responsible for evaluating the reasonableness of the
offered prices. The analytical techniques and procedures described in this section may be used, singly or in combination with others, to ensure that the final price is fair and reasonable. The complexity and circumstances of each acquisition should determine the level of detail of the analysis required.”) (emphasis added); see also U.S. DEP’T OF AIR
FORCE, AIR FORCE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT MANDATORY PROCEDURES [hereinafter
AFFARS MP] pt. 5333.104(c) (2015), available at https://farsite.hill.af.mil (follow “AFFARS” hyperlink; then follow
“MP TOC” hyperlink; then follow “MP5333.104 Protests to GAO” hyperlink) (outlining required contents of the
Agency Report, which include source selection evaluation documents. These documents become more lengthy and
complex based upon the number of offers received); see also AFFARS MP 5315.3(1.4.1.1) (illustrating that the layers
of review required for contract actions increase as complexity and contract value increase).
135. FAR 33.104(h)(1) (2016).
136. Id. 15.404-1(a)(1); AFFARS MP, supra note 134, pts. 5333.104(c), 5315.3(1.4.1.1.); but see 31 U.S.C. §
3554(c)(2)(B) (2012) (under CICA, with the exception of small businesses, reimbursement of attorneys’ fees may not
exceed $150 per hour).
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upon which this article is primarily focused.137 What is of concern, however, is the
one-sided nature of this remedy, as offerors who protest and lose are not equally
obligated to reimburse the government’s costs to resolve the protest.138
A third source of administrative costs is the fact that “[protests] have become
so common that agencies expect them, build them into their contracting timelines,
and regularly train their procurement staffs on how to minimize them.”139 While it
may be prudent to expect protests and prepare procurement personnel to respond
appropriately to them, the corresponding expense is increased acquisition lead times
and potentially reduced productivity due to overtraining.140
3. Indirect Costs
Protests also indirectly impact the federal acquisition system, as the fear of protests may negatively influence contracting officers’ business decisions.141 The prime
example analysts cite is preference to certain source selection procedures (i.e. proposal
evaluation methods) over others.142 Additionally, some contracting officers are reluctant to communicate with their industry counterparts during pre-award procurement stages due to the concern that doing so may invite a protest.143 These behavioral trends work against contracting officers’ efforts to secure best value solutions
for the government.144
Specifically, some contracting officers prefer to employ a lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection process—even when allowing a tradeoff for
non-cost factors (e.g. performance, schedule, or technical capability) more appropriately suits their acquisition—based on the perception that an LPTA approach lowers
their protest risk.145 Statistically, however, offers are no more likely to protest LPTA
source selections than source selections that allow for a tradeoff.146 Even if they were,
using LPTA evaluation criteria does not guarantee that an offeror will not file a protest.147
Additionally, the fear of protests appears to motivate some contracting officers
to award contracts based on initial proposals instead of taking advantage of the op-

137. Gordon, supra note 26, at 503.
138. FAR 33.104(h) (2016). There is no requirement for an interested party whose protest is dismissed to reimburse the government’s costs of addressing the protest.
139. Medici & McElhatton, supra note 26.
140. Id.
141. Gordon, supra note 26, at 506.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 506-07.
145. Id. at 506; see also FAR 15.101-1(a) (2016) (“A tradeoff process is appropriate when it may be in the best
interest of the Government to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than the highest
technically rated offeror.”); see also id. 15.101-2(a) (“The lowest price technically acceptable source selection process
is appropriate when best value is expected to result from selection of the technically acceptable proposal with the
lowest evaluated price.”).
146. Gordon, supra note 26, at 507.
147. Id.
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portunity to conduct discussions (i.e. negotiations) with offerors, which the FAR expressly permits in order to maximize the government’s ability to obtain best value.148
Contracting officers who succumb to this perceived risk contend, “[D]iscussions with
offerors are a legal minefield, such that conducting discussions will increase the likelihood of a bid protest and improve the protestor’s chances of prevailing if a protest
is filed.”149 Just as using an LPTA source selection process does not eliminate protest
risk, however, it is impossible for a contracting officer to completely “protest-proof”
an acquisition by foregoing the opportunity to conduct discussions.150
B. Protest Benefits
While GAO protests impose several costs on the federal acquisition system,
they also generate several benefits for federal procurement stakeholders—especially
accountability and transparency.151 Moreover, published GAO decisions enable procurement agencies to intelligently predict the likelihood that the GAO would sustain
a protest, which motivates such agencies to police themselves to a certain degree and
take corrective action where appropriate.152
1. Protests are a Low-Cost Form of Accountability
Protests offer a relatively low-cost mechanism to bring accountability into the
acquisition system “by providing disgruntled participants a forum for airing their
complaints.”153 Arguably, the fact that the GAO investigates issues raised by nongovernment parties adds more value to the procurement system in terms of accountability than internal government audits.154 After all, “if no one is dissatisfied with the
way the Government conducted a procurement, then it may not be a wise use of
auditors’ time to investigate it.”155
2. Protests Increase Confidence in the Procurement System
Additionally, protests tend to increase overall confidence in the procurement
system.156 “[B]y being directly responsive to participants’ complaints, protests can
increase potential bidders’ confidence in the integrity of the procurement process,
and thereby lead more players to participate, thus increasing competition. Increased
competition, in turn, can motivate bidders to offer lower prices, higher quality, or
148. Id. at 506; see also FAR 15.306(d) (2016) (“Negotiations are exchanges, in either a competitive or sole source
environment, between the Government and offerors, that are undertaken with the intent of allowing the offeror to
revise its proposal. These negotiations may include bargaining. Bargaining includes persuasion, alteration of assumptions and positions, give-and-take, and may apply to price, schedule, technical requirements, type of contract, or other
terms of a proposed contract. When negotiations are conducted in a competitive acquisition, they take place after
establishment of the competitive range and are called discussions.”).
149. Gordon, supra note 26, at 506.
150. Id. at 507.
151. See discussion infra Part 3.B.
152. Id.
153. Gordon, supra note 26, at 507.
154. Id. at 507-08.
155. Id. at 508.
156. Id.
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both, to contracting agencies.”157 Indeed, “absent such mechanisms, entities might
be less willing to do business with the government, which could diminish competition
for government contracts and drive up prices.”158
Protests also increase the public’s confidence in the system.159
While the public only rarely focuses on public contracting, having a protest process
mentioned in the press—as happened when The Boeing Company successfully protested the Air Force’s award of a tanker contract to Northrup Grumman—may raise
the public’s trust in the fairness of the Government’s acquisition system and the way
it spends taxpayer funds.160

Moreover, protests mitigate the risk that public suspicions about the procurement system remain either unaddressed or uncorrected.161
3. Protest Risk Empowers Contracting Officers to Stand their Ground
The risk of a successful protest also affords contracting officers a tactful means
to withstand potential undue influence from their leadership.162 For example, if pressured to award a sole-source contract when market conditions clearly support a competitive source selection, “the [c]ontracting [o]fficer, who may lack the bureaucratic
clout to resist the pressure, could point to the risk of a successful protest as one
additional reason to follow the statutory and regulatory requirements for competition.”163
4. GAO Decisions Provide Guidance
Finally, the GAO widely publishes its protest decisions.164 Accordingly, attorneys on both sides of a protest are better able to advise clients on the strengths and
weaknesses of their respective positions.165 One notable example is that “any corporate counsel who follows GAO bid protest decisions knows how strictly the GAO
applies the ‘late is late’ rule, so that counsel will ensure that their client appreciates
the importance of submitting bids on time.”166
Likewise, the increasing predictability of GAO opinions can motivate a procurement agency to voluntarily take corrective action in response to a protest that it
believes the GAO would sustain (i.e. the protest has merit).167 Accordingly, when an

157. Id.
158. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3.
159. Gordon, supra note 26, at 508.
160. Id.
161. MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3.
162. Gordon, supra note 26, at 508.
163. Id.
164. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Are You Waiting for a Bid Protest Decision?, GAO.GOV,
http://www.gao.gov/legal/are-you-waiting-for-a-bid-protest-decision/about (last visited Feb. 1, 2016). GAO does
not publish dismissed protests, however.
165. Gordon, supra note 26, at 508-10.
166. Id. at 510.
167. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 5.
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agency elects to take corrective action, it thereby mitigates some of the delays triggered by the protest and accelerates its acquisition timeline to deliver the respective
product or service to the end user.168
C. The Argument that the Benefits Outweigh the Costs
Without accepting them as absolute, several compelling arguments exist that
the benefits of GAO protests outweigh the costs.169 Certainly, protests inject “transparency, accountability, and education” into the federal acquisition system and promote the integrity of the same.170 Additionally, the ability to protest may reduce any
public perception that the acquisition system is “corrupt or ineffective.”171 Finally,
“Congress has . . . historically viewed the benefits of protests as outweighing [their]
costs.”172 On balance of the opposing viewpoints and factors discussed above, the
overarching benefits of protests probably do outweigh the costs.173
IV. THE CASE FOR REBALANCING PROTEST COSTS
Even if one subscribes to the theory that the benefits of protests outweigh their
costs, the fact remains that the frequency of GAO protests continues to increase
while the number of sustained protests continues to decrease.174 As a result, the government suffers the increasing administrative burden to address protests that the
GAO ultimately dismisses for lack of merit.175 In light of this circumstance, perhaps
the proper question is not whether the benefits of protests outweigh the costs, but
whether opportunities exist to decrease meritless protests and the government’s costs
to resolve them.176 Requiring protestors to submit a bond with their protest equal to
a percentage of the contract value would likely achieve these objectives.177
A. Clarifying “Meritless Protest”
To properly analyze potential solutions to reduce meritless protests first requires an understanding of what constitutes a “meritless protest.”178 In the majority
of cases, one of three events ends a protest: the GAO dismisses the protest; the protestor withdraws the protest; or the agency and the protestor settle the protest prior
to the GAO’s decision.179 This indicates that a protestor can obtain relief in ways

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.A.1 (highlighting common procurement delays associated with protests).
See discussion infra Part III.C.
Gordon, supra note 26, at 510.
MANUEL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 3.
Id. at 4.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part I.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 4.
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that do not require the GAO to sustain a protest.180 How, then, is one to determine
whether a protest has merit?181
One model considers a protest “effective” if either of two events transpires: (1)
the GAO sustains the protest or (2) the procurement agency voluntarily takes corrective action in response to the protest.182 Using historical data, one can calculate an
“effectiveness rate” by dividing the sum of GAO-sustained protests and protests
where an agency takes corrective action by the total number of protests filed during
a given time period.183 Based on this model, “the effectiveness rate is a rough measure of the number of protests that have actual or potential merit.”184 The average
effectiveness rate of GAO protests over the last five years is forty-two percent.185
Expanding this analysis to FY14, out of the 2,561 GAO protests filed, roughly 1,076
actually had merit and the remaining 1,485 did not.186 To be clear, the costs the government bears as a result of protests in the latter category constitute the source of
contention in this article.187
An important distinction exists between protests that lack merit and those that
are frivolous.188 A protest is frivolous if “a [protestor] grounds its case on arguments
or issues ‘that are beyond the reasonable contemplation of fair-minded people, and
no basis for [the party’s position] in law or fact can be or is even arguably shown.’”189
Moreover, “a legal action found to be without merit is not necessarily frivolous.”190
It accordingly follows that all frivolous protests lack merit, but not all meritless protests are frivolous.191 Nevertheless, the solutions discussed below apply equally to
meritless and frivolous protests.192
B. Historically Proposed Solutions
As previously discussed, due to the one-sided nature of the costs assumed by
the government upon receipt of a protest, a contractor who bids for a government
contract and loses has little more to lose by protesting the award in an effort to increase its chances of ultimately winning a contract.193 Largely for this reason, critics
of the current protest system urge that this discrepancy begs a remedy to reduce the

180. Id.
181. See id. (describing one model to determine whether a protest has merit).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 5.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 3, 5. 1,076 is forty-two percent of 2,561.
187. See discussion infra Part IV.
188. Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger, General Counsel, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, to Committee on Armed
Services, United States Senate, and Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (Apr. 9, 2009), available at http://www. gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/401197.htm.
189. Id. (citing Abbs v. Prinicipi, 237 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
190. Id.
191. Id..
192. See discussion infra Part IV.
193. See discussion supra Part I.
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government’s costs that arise out of meritless protests.194 Historically proposed solutions include sanctioning frivolous protests and allowing procuring agencies to consider an offeror’s protest history during past performance evaluations.195
1. Sanctions
In the face of budget constraints during the 1990s, Congress and the Clinton
administration endeavored to decrease the government’s procurement transaction
costs.196 Pursuant to that objective, the Acquisition Law Advisory Panel recommended, among several items, that the administration impose sanctions on frivolous
protests.197 This remedy “would have required protestors who file baseless protests
to reimburse the [g]overnment for its legal fees and costs associated with defending
the procurement decision.”198 Congress proposed this idea in the Federal Acquisition
Improvement Act of 1995; however, it ultimately did not enact the proposal.199 Notwithstanding the proposal’s failure, Senator John Glenn acknowledged that it was an
important step in “tackl[ing] the controversial, highly charged issue of reform of the
protest system by attempting to streamline it and reduce the number of protests
filed.”200
The notion of imposing sanctions on frivolous protests continues to surface
within the acquisition community.201 For example, between 2006 and 2009, the Air
Force received several GAO protests during its efforts to award a contract for a new
combat search-and-rescue helicopter (CSAR-X).202 Eventually, “[d]ue to adverse
findings by [a] Pentagon audit, Defense Secretary Gates decided to cancel the program ‘for convenience’ . . . .”203 In response, Air Force General Bruce Carlson—who
commanded Air Force Material Command at the time—exclaimed that the CSAR-X
protests delayed vital military programs and estimated that they cost the government
800 million dollars.204 General Carlson attributed these costs to the ease at which
unsuccessful offerors can protest and advocated that the government penalize losing
protestors as a disincentive to file frivolous protests.205

194. See, e.g., Otto Kreisher, General Bemoans Glut of Air Force Contract Protests, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 13, 2008),
http://www.govexec.com/defense/2008/02/general-bemoans-glut-of-air-force-contract-protests/26297 (expressing United States Air Force General Bruce Carlson’s view that protests are so frequent because there are no penalties
for a losing bidder to protest).
195. See id.; GATES, supra note 63, at 24 (citing Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of
Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 697 (2001)).
196. Jonathan R. Cantor, Bid Protests and Procurement Reform: The Case for Leaving Well Enough Alone, 27 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 155, 169-70, 172 (1997) (citing William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes,
9 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 461, 464 (1995).
197. Id. at 170.
198. Id. at 172.
199. Id. (citing S. 669, §§ 1202, 1435, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1388, §§ 1202, 1435 (1995)).
200. 141 CONG. REC. S5, 147 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1995).
201. See, e.g., Defense Industry Daily Staff, supra note 73 (discussing Air Force General Bruce Carlson’s reaction
to protests on the CSAR-X program).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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The problem with sanctions, however, turns on “fundamental questions of fairness and the right of access to judicial and administrative forums.”206 After all, according to one critic:
A successful contract award can help a small business grow substantially. If a business[]
mistakenly challenges the [g]overnment on the assumption that the [g]overnment erroneously granted the contract to a competitor, subjecting the business to further sanctions for the error is improper. Although [sanctions] might help make a more streamlined protest system by reducing the number of protests, [they have] the unfortunate
consequence of chilling the rights of contractors who do business with the [g]overnment.207

This observation makes an important point about the role of small businesses
in federal procurement.208 Based on a related study, “[s]maller companies generate
most of the protests and larger companies protest more strategically.”209 This intuitively makes sense, as small businesses generally rely on fewer revenue sources than
large businesses, which typically enjoy numerous and well-diversified revenue
sources.210 Thus, small businesses arguably have more at stake in bidding for government contracts than large businesses, and thereby have an increased incentive to
protest an unfavorable contract award.211
The same study revealed that “larger companies achieve more sustained protests [than smaller companies] . . . .”212 Perhaps this is because larger companies can
better afford to invest in sophisticated resources to make more informed decisions
on when filing a protest makes good business sense.213 Whatever the reason, this is
a significant finding, as Congress strives to maximize small business participation in
federal acquisitions.214 Accordingly, any proposal that seeks to decrease meritless
protests must consider the proposal’s impact on small businesses.215
In addition to these concerns, although the FAR does not specifically label this
remedy as a “sanction,” Congress apparently has already determined and codified
what constitutes sanctionable conduct in the context of federal procurement.216 FAR
33.102(b)(3), for example, provides that the head of the procurement agency may
“[r]equire the awardee to reimburse the Government’s costs, as provided in this paragraph, where a postaward protest is sustained as the result of an awardee’s intentional

206. Cantor, supra note 196, at 176.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. STEVEN M. MASER, IMPROVING GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING: LESSONS FROM BID PROTESTS OF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOURCE SELECTIONS at 21 (2012), available at http://www.businessofgovernment.
org/report/improving-government-contracting-lessons-bid-protests-department-defense-source-selections.
210. Id. at 21-22.
211. Id. at 22.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 21-22.
214. FAR 19.201(a) (2016) (“It is the policy of the Government to provide maximum practicable opportunities in
its acquisitions to small business . . . .”).
215. Accord id.
216. Id. 33.102(b)(3).
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or negligent misstatement, misrepresentation, or miscertification.”217 Moreover, the GAO contends that sanctions may produce “the unintended consequence of harming the federal procurement system by discouraging participation in federal contracting and, in
turn, limiting competition.”218 For these reasons, sanctions are an inappropriate
means to resolve the issue at hand.219
2. Past Performance Evaluations
In addition to sanctions, some critics of the protest system advocate that the
government should consider an offeror’s protest history during past performance
evaluations.220 The FAR enumerates past performance as “one indicator of an offeror’s ability to perform [a] contract successfully.”221 If a procuring agency elects to
evaluate past performance, it must consider “[t]he currency and relevance of the information, source of the information, context of the data, and general trends in contractors’ performance.”222
Just as with sanctions, however, the GAO is concerned that considering protest
history in past performance evaluations would yield unintended consequences—especially decreased competition—that outweigh any perceived gains in efficiency.223
“Importantly, any system that imposes penalties on contractors for filing frivolous
protests would require adequate due process protections to avoid punishing a company for filing a good-faith but unmeritorious protest.”224 Most significantly, however, an offeror’s protest history most likely has no bearing on the “offeror’s ability
to perform [a] contract successfully.”225 Evaluating an offeror’s protest history, then,
would controvert the FAR’s requirement to consider relevant past performance.226
Thus, evaluating protest history is also an inappropriate means to reduce meritless
protests.227
C. Inspiration from State Procurement Regulations and the NFL
Instead of punishing contractors for filing meritless protests, a better strategy
to decrease meritless protests, as well as the government’s costs to resolve them, is
to require protestors to submit a bond with their protest equal to a percentage of the
total contract value.228 In the event the GAO sustains a protest or the procuring
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger to Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, supra note 188, at 12.
219. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1.
220. See, e.g., Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger to Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, supra note 188, at 13 (identifying various suggestions to disincentivize frivolous protests).
221. FAR 15.305(a)(2)(i) (2016).
222. Id.
223. Letter from Gary L. Kepplinger to Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, and Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, supra note 188, at 13.
224. Id.
225. FAR 15.305(a)(2)(i) (2016).
226. Id.
227. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
228. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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agency takes corrective action, the GAO or the procuring agency, respectively, would
return the protest bond to the protestor.229 If the GAO dismisses the protest, however, the government would retain the bond to offset its administrative costs to resolve the protest.230 This proposed solution quells the punitive undertones of sanctions and negative past performance evaluations and adopts a more equitable
approach to address the issue of meritless protests.231 At least four states currently
employ a variation of this approach, as does the NFL via the Coaches’ Challenge
Rule.232
1. State Procurement Regulations
For example, in Florida, protestors must submit a bond with their protest equal
to one percent of the estimated contract value.233 If the procuring agency prevails
against the protest, it recovers its costs—except attorney’s fees—through the protest
bond and returns the remainder to the protestor.234 Equally, if the protestor prevails
on its protest, the procuring agency (1) returns the bond to the protestor and (2) pays
the protestor’s costs and charges—excluding attorney’s fees—to pursue the protest.235
Hawaii employs a similar approach with a slight variation.236 Instead of requiring a bond equal to one percent of the estimated contract value, Hawaii requires a
$1,000 bond for contracts valued at less than $500,000; a $2,000 bond for contracts
valued between $500,001 and $1,000,000; and a bond equal to one-half per cent of
the estimated contract value if that value is greater than $1,000,000.237 In no event,
however, may a protest bond exceed $10,000.238 As in Florida, Hawaii’s protest regulation requires the procuring agency to return the bond to a successful protestor.239
Unlike Florida’s regulations, however—where the state returns the remainder of the
protest bond to the protestor after assessing the state’s costs to resolve the protest—
the protestor forfeits the entire bond to the state if it protests unsuccessfully.240
In Nevada, a protestor must submit a bond with its protest equal to 25% of the
successful bid.241 If the protest succeeds, the state returns the bond to the protestor.242 If the procuring agency sustains the protest, Nevada’s Department of Administration holds a hearing to assess the costs involved in resolving the protest.243 The

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.042(2)(c) (West 2016).
Id.
Id.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 333.370(2)-(3) (West 2015).
Id. § 333.370(10).
Id.
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state then recoups its incurred costs from the bond and returns the remainder to the
protestor.244
Finally, within its Department of Transportation, Tennessee requires a protestor to submit a bond with its protest equal to 5% of the estimated total project cost.245
The state, however, only retains the bond if the Department commissioner determines (1) that the protestor pursued the protest in bad faith, or (2) if “the protest
does not state on its face a valid basis for protest.”246 If the commissioner makes
either one of these findings, he must notify the protestor in writing of the decision
to retain the protest bond.247
According to the National Association of State Procurement Officials
(NASPO), there is insufficient data to confirm the degree to which protest bonds
discourage frivolous protests.248 In spite of this sparse data, what is more clear is that
the rationale for protest bonds is to minimize meritless protests and to allow a state
to reduce its administrative costs to resolve protests.249 Moreover, a protest bond
undoubtedly changes an unsuccessful offeror’s mindset when it comes to the decision
of whether to file a protest.250 Instead of asking what they have to lose by protesting,
unsuccessful offerors subject to a protest bond requirement must evaluate whether
the time to acquire a bond and the risk of losing it justify protesting in the first
place.251
2. The NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule
The NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule further clarifies the wisdom behind protest
bonds.252 As previously discussed, the NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule affords a team
two opportunities per game to challenge various rulings on the field.253 To initiate a
challenge, a coach simply throws a red flag onto the field from the sideline after the
previous play and before the next play begins.254 A previously unmentioned caveat
to rule, however, is that a team must use a timeout for each challenge.255 If the official
upholds the challenge, the Rule reinstates the timeout.256 If the official overrules the
challenge, however, the challenging team forfeits its timeout.257
244. Id.
245. TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-1-505(b)(3) (West 2016).
246. Id. § 54-1-505(b)(6).
247. Id.
248. DEAN STOTLER ET AL., STATE BID PROTESTS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE PROCUREMENT
OFFICIALS
4
(Apr.
2013),
available
at
http://www.naspo.org/dnn/portals/16/
documents/.FINAL_NASPO_BidProtests_Research_Brief_042413.pdf.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Defense Industry Daily Staff, supra note 73 (highlighting General Carlson’s view that the current protest
system encourages protests because bidders have nothing to lose by filing them); see also STOTLER ET AL., supra note
248, at 4 (describing the rationale for protest bonds among the states that use them).
252. See GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63 (requiring a coach to put a timeout at stake before challenging any ruling
on the field).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63
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By requiring a team to put a timeout at stake, this provision prevents the
Coaches’ Challenge from being a mere roll of the dice and equitably balances each
team’s interest in fair rulings with the officials’ interest in minimizing game delays.258
Undeniably, “challenges are part of game management, because they are directly
linked to timeouts and can cause the loss of time on the clock, putting [a] team in a
bad situation.”259 A coach must accordingly analyze the costs and benefits of a challenge to his team before he throws his red flag.260 Emphatically, “[u]nless the evidence is clear-cut, a rational decision must be made, not an emotional one.”261
Just as state protest bond requirements impose an additional analytical component on the decision to protest, the Coaches’ Challenge Rule illustrates the principle
that, in order to prevent abuse of a protest system, the protestor must have skin in
the game.262 Conceivably, if the Coaches’ Challenge Rule did not require a team to
use a timeout in order to challenge a ruling on the field, coaches would have no incentive to use their challenges judiciously.263 The same holds true if the Rule did not
limit the number of challenges a team may use per game.264
Based on GAO protest statistics, the current federal procurement protest
scheme is akin to a coaches challenge rule that does not require a team to use a
timeout prior to a challenge.265 That is, the increased frequency of protests to the
GAO, coupled with the simultaneous decrease in the number of sustained protests,
suggest that unsuccessful offerors are abusing the system.266 Consequently, the government bears significant costs to address meritless protests.267
3. Integrating Protest Bonds into Federal Procurement Regulations
Based on the state protest regulations discussed above and the intricacies of the
NFL’s Coaches’ Challenge Rule, there are a variety of potential approaches to integrate protest bonds into federal procurement regulations to discourage meritless protests and equitably distribute protest costs between the protestor and the government.268 The simplest—and arguably most cost-effective—solution would closely
mirror Hawaii’s protest regulation and the Coaches’ Challenge Rule.269 That is, require a protestor to submit a bond with its protest equal to a certain percentage of

258. See, e.g., Lombardi, McCarthy’s Challenge Raises Red Flag, Costs Packers Chance, NFL NETWORK (Sept. 28, 2010,
9:40 PM; last updated Aug. 3, 2012, 10:23 AM), available at http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81aebdfb/article/mccarthys-challenge-raises-red-flag-costs-packers-chance/ (discussing the Coaches’ Challenge Rule as
part of game management).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63.
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & MANUEL, supra note 20, at 6-8 (illustrating the increasing frequency of protests and the
decreasing frequency of sustained protests as a percentage of total protests filed).
266. Id.
267. See discussion supra Introduction.
268. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1-2.
269. HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015); GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63.
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estimated contract value.270 If the protestor wins, the government would return the
bond to the protestor in full.271 If the protestor loses, the government would retain
the full amount of the bond.272 Intuitively, this all-or-nothing approach would be
simple to administer.273 The downside, however, is that it might not produce the
most “fair” result in every case.274
Alternatively, Congress could implement a protest bond scheme similar to Nevada’s.275 Under this approach, a protestor would submit a bond in the amount of a
certain percentage of the estimated contract value.276 If the protestor is successful,
the government would return the entire bond to the protestor.277 If the protestor is
unsuccessful, however, the government would retain the value of its costs to resolve
the protest and return the remainder to the protestor.278 This approach is likely more
administratively burdensome than Hawaii’s, as the government in this case would
have to track its costs to resolve a protest.279 At the same time, however, this approach appears to more equitably balance the costs involved to address a protest by
returning any unused portion of the protest bond to the protestor.280
A third source of variation among state protest regulations is the amount of the
protest bond.281 For example, some states impose a fixed protest bond when the
estimated contract value falls within a certain dollar range.282 Other states base protest bond requirements on a percentage of contract value.283 One potential issue with
this approach is that, once contract value exceeds a certain threshold, the required
bond will dwarf the government’s costs to address the protest.284 An equitable approach to deter meritless protests should not result in a windfall for the government
in the event a protestor loses a protest.285 One way to mitigate this risk would be to
270. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015) (requiring the protestor to submit a bond that varies
with the estimated contract amount); see also GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63 (requiring a coach to use a timeout in
order to exercise a challenge).
271. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015) (the government returns the bond to the protestor if
the protestor is successful); see also GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63 (a team recovers its timeout if it successfully challenges an official ruling on the field).
272. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015) (the government retains the bond if the protestor is
unsuccessful); see also GOODELL, supra note 2, at 63 (a team loses its timeout if it unsuccessfully challenges an official
ruling on the field).
273. See discussion supra Part IV.C.3.
274. See, e.g., 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(b) (2016) (discussing that untimely protests may be dismissed). It may not seem “fair”
for the government to retain the entire amount of a protest bond if it immediately dismisses a protest as untimely, as
little time and effort is required on the government’s part to justify retaining the entire bond amount.
275. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 333.370(2)-(3), (10) (West 2015).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 333.370(2)-(3), (10) (West 2015).
281. See FLA. STAT. ANN § 287.042(2)(c) (West 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 333.370(2)-(3), (10) (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 54-1-505 (West 2015).
282. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015) (imposing fixed protest bond requirements within
certain contract value ranges).
283. FLA. STAT. ANN § 287.042(2)(c) (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 333.370(2)-(3) (West 2015).
284. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 333.370(2)-(3) (West 2015). For example, if the state of Nevada awarded a two
billion dollar contract, to protest the award would require the unsuccessful offeror to post a bond in the amount of
five hundred million dollars.
285. Accord Cantor, supra note 196, at 169-70, 172 (discussing reasons why sanctions are an improper means to
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establish a maximum value for a protest bond.286 In any event, to establish a suitable
protest bond requirement at the federal level, legislators should consider that the
bond must be large enough to deter meritless protests, but not so great as to resemble
a punitive remedy.287
Ultimately, the decision to integrate protest bonds into the federal procurement
system belongs to Congress, which must consider several factors in its analysis.288 At
a minimum, a protest bond requirement must preserve “fairness and the right of
access to . . . administrative forums.”289 Inherent in this principle is the importance
of considering potential impacts on small businesses.290 One way to address this issue
is to establish separate protest bond requirements for large and small businesses.291
Congress must also ensure that the details of a protest bond requirement are otherwise compatible with related regulations like CICA and the Small Business Act.292
Notwithstanding this non-exhaustive list of challenges, incorporating a protest bond
requirement into federal procurement regulations is certainly feasible.293 Based on
the foregoing analysis, Congress should integrate a protest bond requirement into
federal procurement regulations in an effort to (1) suppress the apparent “What do
we have to lose?” mentality that the current system perpetuates and (2) to decrease
the frequency of meritless protests.294
V.

CONCLUSION

Statistically, the frequency of bid protests to the GAO continues to increase
while the percentage of sustained protests continues to decrease.295 Moreover, with
a current average effectiveness rate of 42%—which accounts for sustained protests
and protests where an agency voluntarily takes corrective action—roughly 60% of
protests filed with the GAO lack merit.296 As a result, the government suffers the
increasing administrative burden to address protests that the GAO ultimately dismisses or denies.297 Although the overarching benefits of protests probably outweigh
reduce the number of protests filed). Similarly, a requirement that a protestor submit a bond equal to a percentage
of contract value could have equally chilling effects if the estimated contract value exceeds a certain dollar threshold.
286. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 103D-709(e) (West 2015) (establishing a maximum protest bond value of
$10,000).
287. See, e.g., Cantor, supra note 196, at 176 (discussing that sanctions “raise[] fundamental questions of fairness
and the right of access to judicial and administrative forums.”). Accordingly, legislators must be careful to select a
bond value that does not raise such concerns.
288. KATE M. MANUEL ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PUB. NO. R42826, THE FEDERAL
ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR): ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 20-21 (Feb. 3, 2015), available
at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42826.pdf/; see Cantor, supra note 196, at 169-70, 172 (discussing considerations that led Congress to reject sanctions as a means to deter frivolous protests).
289. Cantor, supra note 196, at 176.
290. Id.
291. See FAR 19.102 (2016). A procurement agency can readily make objective small business determinations
based on size standards established by the Small Business Administration. Thus, this proposed solution would be
simple to implement.
292. 10 U.S.C § 2304 (2012); 15 U.S.C.A §§ 631-657s (2012).
293. See discussion supra Part IV.
294. See discussion supra Introduction.
295. Id.
296. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
297. See discussion supra Part IV.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2016

25

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 52 [2016], Iss. 2, Art. 25

392

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:367

the costs, this circumstance raises the question of whether opportunities exist to decrease meritless protests and the government’s administrative costs to resolve
them.298
At least four states have confronted this issue by requiring protestors to submit
a bond with their protest equal to a certain percentage of estimated contract value.299
Instead of asking what they have to lose by protesting unfavorable procurement actions, protestors in these states must first assess whether the time and expense of
submitting a bond justifies their protest.300
The NFL has also tackled this issue by adopting the Coaches’ Challenge
301
Rule. By requiring a team to use a timeout in order to challenge a ruling on the
field, a coach must analyze the costs and benefits of a challenge to his team before
he throws his red flag.302 Moreover, the Rule requires Coaches to challenge based
principally on reason rather than emotion.303
To date, Congress has unsuccessfully resolved the issue at hand.304 It has contemplated imposing sanctions on frivolous protests and permitting procuring agencies to consider an offeror’s protest record during past performance evaluations.305
Both proposals failed, however, due to their punitive nature.306 Unlike these historically proposed solutions, a protest bond requirement would exude less punitive characteristics and would more equitably balance the administrative costs to address protests between procurement agencies and their private sector counterparts.307
Accordingly, Congress should consider amending federal bid protest regulations to
require protestors to include a bond with their protest equal to a percentage of total
contract value in an effort to (1) suppress the apparent “What do we have to lose?”
mentality that the current protest system perpetuates and (2) to decrease the frequency of meritless protests.

298.
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300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
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See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.
Id.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra IV.B.
Id.
Id.
See discussion supra Part IV.C.
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